The Group Caisse d'Epargne refinances up to 30 on the markets through three signatures: Caisse nationale des Caisses d'Epargne (CNCE), Credit Foncier to Natixis. And, for the balance, on customer deposits. For the Caisse d'Epargne group finance director, model of continental European banks, which favour the retention of assets in the balance sheet, has been the most relevant to the crisis.
What the crisis has had on your own policy of refinancing
The cost of refinancing market is undeniably bid in significant proportions of because of the increase in interbank rates and margins required by investors. For example, for a show in two years, the cost rose from 4.4 to 4.85 in a few months. However, in a difficult market, we could achieve 80 of our refinancing program to end of September with the quality of our signature and our very limited risk profile that the market appreciates. We preferred the transactions in OTC and short maturities to limit the impact of the price increases of the conditions of issuance. In addition, the long part of our refinancing is largely provided by the stable part of our customer deposits.
You however just to launch a bond for a period of twelve years.
It was a show for Caisses d'Epargne customers, planned in our funding. We are in making three or four each year. It complements our long resources collected from our customers.
The price increases of the cost of refinancing led you to raise rates of credits
Mechanically, the short-term loans indexed to the Euribor rate has increased. On mortgage, we have passed the increase in long-term market rates, but it has been more moderate since the crisis.
The rate of government bonds, refers to mortgage, yet fell.
The decline is recent but the trend remains upward. In addition, this is not the only benchmark. Banks do not fund under the same conditions as the State. It must therefore take into account the interbank rate. The context calls for an increase in the rate. However, it is a very competitive and all banks are not equal in terms of access to liquidity.
The setbacks of Northern Rock showed the limits of its refinancing model.
Among the difficulties encountered by Northern Rock, must be distinguished because of refinancing liquidity risk short term assets long-term model for access to the market, which had diversified. The diversification of sources of refinancing is essential. Indeed, we should launch a new vehicle of refinancing in the spring next to further improve this diversification.
This will be a competing vehicle to Credit Foncier
No, the two vehicles will be complementary. Through the company's financing land, we refinanšons today loans to local communities and habitat supported a public guarantee. With this new vehicle, we will be able to refinance our mortgage guaranteed, which represent more than two-thirds of loans that are committed and are not eligible for the existing device. It will be therefore a vehicle of "covered bonds" structured and non-issuance of a new company of credit.
Will you, at the same time, reduce your other types of programming
We'll certainly less emissions under the National Fund for savings banks (CNCE) signature.
The current period is still not the best time to launch a new vehicle
On the contrary, our analysis of the crisis strengthens us in our conviction. These vehicles to cope with a structural evolution of the balance sheets of banks who see their deposits grow less quickly than before. I believe that the crisis, which resulted in closure of access to liquidity via securitization, so via the output of the asset in the balance sheet, will lead to the development of this type of secure vehicles. Ultimately, banks will have to choose between externalize assets, accordingly reduce their consumption of own funds but accept a "funding" higher costs or retain these assets on the balance sheet, there affect equity but optimize the costs of refinancing. This closely the terms of the comparative analysis are now significantly changed. It must integrate the ability of resistance to the crisis. However, on this component, the model where stocks remain on the balance sheet for a significant part, preferred by most large continental European banks, proved effective enough... And Basel II, which will enter into force on January 1, is in this sense. The first regulation of the own funds, Basel I, was, in the absolute and very caricatured manner, allow a bank to securitize assets it bought out titles, thus keeping the hand on assets without having to balance. Basel II eliminates the ability of arbitration because, the outstanding amount of credit is in the balance sheet or that it be securitized, the own funds requirements are close.